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I.  Introduction. 
Successful political systems hold politicians accountable for corrupt behavior. 
The principal mechanisms of such accountability include checks and balances among 
branches of government, law enforcement, and voting in elections.  Political theorists 
going back to Locke, Montesquieu, and Madison emphasize the centrality of 
accountability for good government.  More recently, the various mechanisms have been 
investigated by Barro 1973, Ferejohn 1986, Przeworski et al. 2000, Schedler et al. 1999, 
Persson and Tabellini 2003, Besley and Prat 2006, among others.  A number of empirical 
studies show the benefits of accountability for the quality of government (e.g., Besley and 
Case 1995, La Porta et al. 1999, Adsera et al. 2003, Eijffinger and Geraats 2005, Olken 
2007, Dyck et al. 2008, Ferraz and Finan 2008, Bjorkman and Svensson 2009).   
Accountability of government officials for corruption relies on availability of 
information about their activities.  Recent analyses focus on the role of the media as the 
source of discovery and dissemination of such information to both voters and law 
enforcement agencies (e.g., Brunetti and Weder 2003, Djankov et al. 2003, Besley and 
Prat 2006, Reinikka and Svensson 2004).  Media surely matter, but there is another, 
relatively neglected, source of information that facilitates discovery of corruption, namely 
disclosure by politicians of their finances and business activities. By exposing 
inconsistencies between the politician’s actual conduct and his reports about it, disclosure 
can influence both reporting in the media (and thus voting) and law enforcement. 
There are complex theoretical issues concerning what should be disclosed and 
how publicly.  Disclosure conflicts with privacy, for example, which many regard as a 
value in itself.  Privacy also protects politicians, particularly the well-off ones, from 
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populist media coverage or even from robbery or kidnapping.  Such protection might, in 
turn, bring more qualified people into politics.  But if the political market is like other 
markets, then better information about the goods being transacted, such as politicians, 
improves market performance (see Hirshleifer 1980, Stigler 1980, Posner 1981).    
Even if some disclosure is warranted to improve the performance of the political 
market, the community needs to decide what should be disclosed and to whom.  The law 
can emphasize the disclosure of sources of income and business connections, presumably 
to deter politicians from supporting legislation from which they benefit personally. 
Alternatively, the law can emphasize the disclosure of levels of income, consumption, 
and wealth, presumably to make it easier to identify consumption unaffordable from 
official resources. Or the politicians may have to disclose both.  We do not know 
empirically whether actual disclosures focus on asset and income levels or on sources, 
and whether either of these types of disclosure matters for accountability.   
Another key question is whether disclosure should be made public. Those 
concerned with privacy can argue that politicians should disclose to some official office 
that keeps the information secret unless questions are raised about the politician’s 
conduct that require an investigation.  On the other hand, political mechanisms such as 
media coverage, voting, and investigation are most effective when disclosure is public. 
Again, it is an empirical question whether confidential or public disclosure works better.          
In this paper, we analyze the rules and the practices of disclosure by members of 
the lower house of parliament or congress (henceforth MPs) in 175 countries. The 
analysis is based on the laws governing financial and business disclosure of MPs, and on 






   
 
 
   
 
 
mandates, 2) public availability of disclosures in practice, and 3) the extent of 
information being disclosed.   We collect new data to construct several disclosure indices 
for all countries and to assess their determinants and their effects on perceived corruption.  
We find that, although 109 of 175 countries in our sample have disclosure laws, 
more than half of them do not make disclosures available to the public in practice.  Even 
in cases of public disclosure, what is available to the public is often limited.  Using a new 
methodology that compares the potential and the actual disclosure, we find that, for the 
average country with required disclosures, less than 15 percent of potential information 
about the MPs is actually available to the public.  Yet we also find that it is public rather 
than confidential disclosure that is associated with lower perceived corruption.  With 
respect to the content of disclosure, our evidence shows that identifying the assets, 
liabilities, income sources, and conflicts is associated with lower perceived corruption. 
In contrast, we find no significant evidence of benefits from the disclosure of values of 
income, consumption, and wealth.   
We construct indices of disclosure by politicians for 175 countries and assess their 
relationship to corruption.  But why would one think, a priori, that such disclosure 
matters? We have found recent newspaper accounts of failures to disclose accurately 
leading to criticism and disciplinary action against MPs in over 20 countries.  Some 
examples illustrate how this works.  A Puerto Rican legislator, Nicolas Nogueras, was 
forced to resign as vice president of the senate because “financial statements he filed in 
recent years do not explain where he came with the money to make a $50,000 down 
payment for a $350,000 second home.”  The Argentine Economy Minister, Felisa Miceli, 











bathroom of her office, and she failed to explain where the money came from in light of 
the asset declaration she had submitted.  In South Africa, several prominent politicians, 
including Winnie Mandela, were caught with assets far in excess of their declarations, 
and eventually left their parliamentary positions, some landing in jail.  In the U.K., two 
Labour MPs, Mo Mowlam and Bob Wareing, failed to declare outside interests and gave 
wrong information when challenged. The former was mildly censured, the latter 
suspended from the Commons.  Finally, in 2008 the U.S. saw two major investigations 
(and in the second case, a criminal conviction) related to a failure to disclose: 
Democratic Representative Charlie Rangel and Republican Senator Ted Stevens.     
In all these examples, financial and conflict of interest disclosure is part of a 
broader system of accountability that includes media reporting, law enforcement, party 
discipline, and voting itself.  In general, MPs are vulnerable to at least two major sources 
of undue influence.  First, they are sometimes paid directly by heads of government 
needing their votes with bribes (or perhaps more benignly through appropriations for 
their constituents).  Such direct payments have been alleged in Brazil, Russia, and 
Argentina, and have been extensively documented in Peru under Fujimori (McMillan and 
Zoido 2004).  Second, MPs may support bills that either benefit themselves or their 
families directly, or alternatively benefit selected constituents who pay for the bills 
through bribes or favors (Faccio 2006, Gehlbach et al. 2007).  Both kinds of corruption 
are more easily detected when MPs must disclose their assets because their observed 
consumption exceeds the declared resources (Di Tella 2007).  Voting for bills benefiting 
the MP or specific constituents can also be more easily detected when business dealings 
or income sources are disclosed.  Once excessive consumption or conflicted voting is 
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detected, they can be addressed by law enforcement agencies or exposed in the 
newspapers, which may sway voters. Disclosure thus sheds light on misconduct by MPs 
by pointing to discrepancies or outright conflicts.   
There is a natural parallel between financial and business disclosure by politicians 
and that by corporations issuing securities (Grossman and Hart 1980, La Porta et al 2006) 
or by corporate executives involved in self-dealing transactions (Djankov et al. 2008).   In 
all these instances, disclosure brings the potentially conflicted conduct into light, so that 
the ultimate decision makers, be they law enforcement officials, shareholders, or voters, 
can exercise their rights in disciplining misconduct.   
We examine the relationship between perceived corruption
2 and the various 
channels of accountability, including disclosure, media, and democratic institutions.  We 
face the challenge that disclosure rules are recent.  Although some countries had 
disclosure earlier, modern disclosure practices begin in the 1980s, and the international 
push toward disclosure by politicians occurs in the last 20 years, as part of a broader 
wave of democratization.  Close to half of the countries in our sample passed disclosure 
laws in the 1990s.  If the effects of disclosure materialize slowly, we might not be able to 
observe, at the start of the 21
st century, their full effect on corruption.
3 
More generally, we do not have enough information to causally interpret the link 
between disclosure and corruption, in part because there are omitted variables, and in part 
because corruption itself can shape disclosure legislation.  Some obvious instruments 
such as culture or legal traditions are likely to predict corruption directly and not just 
2 In addition to the papers already mentioned, empirical studies of determinants of corruption include
Treisman (2000, 2007), Fisman and Gatti (2002), and Svensson (2005).  
3 We have no data on the role of law enforcement in battling corruption.  We have made a substantial effort




   
 
   
                                                 
 
   
 
 
through disclosure.  Nonetheless, our paper provides the first evidence as to which 
aspects of disclosure are correlated with perceived corruption, and as such generates 
useful hypotheses for future work. 
In section II, we describe our data.  Section III presents the basic facts about the 
determinants of disclosure rules around the world.  Section IV shows the effects of 
various institutions, including disclosure, on perceived corruption.  Section V concludes. 
II. Data. 
Sample Description 
We present a new database on financial and business disclosure of members of 
the lower house of parliament (MPs) in 175 countries.
4  Upper house members, cabinet 
members, and judges are also frequently required to file disclosure forms, but this paper 
focuses on MPs in part because other high level officials are often subject to similar 
disclosure requirements, and in part because MPs are numerous enough that extreme 
political sensitivity in data collection can be avoided.  The data have been assembled by 
the co-authors and several collaborators over three years. 
As a first step, we used the internet as well as contacts with country government 
agencies, World Bank country offices, UN missions, and local Non-Governmental 
Organizations and academics to assemble the database of laws governing disclosure by 
MPs as of June 2008.  There is no standard “law” that addresses disclosure, so in the end 
we assembled (and translated) over 1000 laws and regulations, including constitutions, 
4 The distribution of countries in the sample is: 45 from Sub-Saharan Africa; 19 from Middle East and 
North Africa; 7 from South Asia; 28 from East/Central Europe and Central Asia; 23 from East Asia and 
Pacific; 30 from Latin America and Caribbean; and 23 from OECD.  
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parliament standing orders, and anti-corruption and conflict of interest laws.  Whenever 
possible, we contacted multiple sources to verify the accuracy of information.    
The analysis of the laws revealed that some kind of disclosure is required of MPs 
in 109 of our 175 countries, and no disclosure is legally required in the remaining 66 
countries (see Table 1).  The list of countries with no legally required disclosure is 
dominated by 27 countries from Sub-Saharan Africa, but also includes 12 from the 
Middle East and North Africa, and another 11 from East Asia Pacific. In addition to the 
109 countries with disclosure requirements, 5 countries have no legal requirement but use 
voluntary disclosure mechanisms established either by parliamentary rules (Denmark, 
Finland, and Norway),
5 internal party regulations (Singapore), or imitation of disclosure 
by cabinet members (Zambia).    
An examination of the laws yielded a crucial observation that became central to 
our analysis.  Specifically, there are large differences among countries in the ability of 
citizens to access the MPs’ disclosure forms.  In 46 of the 109 countries mandating 
disclosure by law, disclosure is made solely to specific government agencies, such as the 
Speaker of Parliament or an internal Comptroller, but is inaccessible to the public.  Most 
of these countries without public disclosure are from low and middle income groups. 
Among OECD countries, only France has disclosure without public availability by law. 
The other 63 countries make some kind of disclosure available to the public by law.  In 3 
of these countries, disclosure must be made public after application by members of the 
press.  Another 9 countries only make disclosure publicly available under certain 
conditions, such as the authorization of the Speaker, the Comptroller, or the MP.  Finally, 
6 countries have different public availability standards for different kinds of disclosure, 








   
                                                 
   
   
  
keeping some disclosures from public access.
6 Of the 175 sample countries, only 46 
mandate that MPs make all required disclosures publicly available without conditions! 
This is a rather low number if this information is relevant to voting decisions.   
As it turns out, even mandating public disclosure by law is no guarantee that the 
public can obtain this information.  To take this into account, we tried to collect the filled 
out disclosure forms in countries with public disclosure, using the assistance of the World 
Bank researchers and students in the relevant countries.  We tried to obtain the filled out 
forms of the first four MPs in alphabetical order and of the speaker of the lower house. 
We made sure that no inappropriate methods were used to obtain the forms.  We were 
able to obtain the actual filled-out disclosure forms in 55 countries.  In 50 of these cases 
disclosures are publicly available by law, in one case (Bahrain) we obtained the forms 
even though public disclosure is not mandatory, and in another 4 cases there is a 
voluntary system of disclosure in place without legal mandates. We obtained the filled-
out forms either through the internet, or through one or multiple appearances at the 
relevant government office.
7  We failed to obtain the filled-out forms in 13 countries. 
These include countries where forms must be publicly available by law (Algeria, Angola, 
Namibia, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Uganda), with specific conditions (Bahamas, Belize, Cape 
Verde, Kazakhstan, Mexico and Nicaragua), or via the press (Russia).  The central 
distinction we measure is that between any legal disclosure requirement and disclosures 
actually available to the public.  We have also constructed measures of public disclosure 
according to the law, as opposed to in practice, but as we show they are not what matters.   
6  South Korea is included in this group because the law does not specify the public availability of conflicts 
of interest’s disclosures.  In practice, we were able to access all disclosures for South Korean MPs. 
7 In 4 countries (Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, and Spain), we could not photocopy the forms but could copy 














As a second aspect of measuring disclosure, we consider its content and 
comprehensiveness.  Even among the countries that mandate public disclosure, the actual 
disclosure available to the public is often far less complete than that available to 
government agencies.  To get at the content, we sought to obtain the blank forms that 
MPs are asked to fill out from all countries with legally required disclosures or with 
voluntary disclosure systems. We obtained such blank forms from 106 countries, 
including 101 with legally required disclosures and another 5 with voluntary disclosure 
systems in place.  We failed to obtain blank forms in eight countries.
8   For the countries 
where public disclosure is more limited than that to congress, we collected both types of 
forms.  We then used the blank and filled-out disclosure forms to construct indices of 
completeness of disclosure relative to the benchmark of a “universal” disclosure form 
that contains all the disclosures used in any of sample countries.  We thus have 
information not only about the broad mandates required by the law, but also about the 
extent of actual disclosure when the MPs fill out the forms. 
Disclosure Variables 
Based on the information-gathering strategies described above, we construct eight 
disclosure variables.  These and other variables used in the analysis are defined in Table 
2.  Summary statistics are presented in Table 3.     
The first group includes two indicators that do not rely on the content of 
disclosures.  The first records whether any disclosure is required from MPs.  As Table 3 
shows, 62 percent of countries in our sample require some kind of disclosure from MPs 
8 In Angola and Togo there is a “free form” system in place, in Morocco and Swaziland the form does not 
exist, in Papua New Guinea we were told the form is confidential, and we have not been able to confirm if 








   
 
 
                                                 
 
  
         
 
and these disclosures are always available to congress or another specified body.  High-
and upper-middle income countries are more likely to require disclosures, while only 35 
percent of low income nations have MP disclosure requirements. The second variable in 
Table 3 records whether disclosure is actually available to the public, i.e., citizens have 
access to the completed forms in practice.  In our sample, disclosure is publicly available 
by law or under certain conditions in 63 countries but publicly available in practice in 55 
countries, including the four countries with voluntary disclosures mentioned above (see 
Table 1).  Less than a third of the total sample has genuine public disclosure. 
The second group of variables deals with the content of disclosure.  Roughly 
speaking, we ask what share of “conceivable” disclosures are actually made by MPs.  For 
these content variables, we construct a measure of what is available to congress
9 (based 
on the blank forms) and a measure of what is actually available to the public (based on 
the filled out forms we obtained).
10  We assume that MPs disclose what they are asked to 
disclose on the blank form, but not more.  We use the blank disclosure forms collected 
from 106 countries to construct an artificial universal disclosure form that incorporates all 
information that any country requires its MPs to disclose.  For each country, we keep 
track of which of these “universal form” items are disclosed to congress or to the public. 
When there is an ambiguity as to what a particular disclosure request calls for (i.e., Does 
a request to disclose share ownership cover mutual funds?), we assume that the form 
intends broader disclosure (i.e., yes, it does), thus raising national content scores. 
9   Throughout the paper, we refer to “disclosures to congress,” as a shortcut for disclosures available either 
congress or any other entity that serves as the registry for the disclosures of MPs, even if this entity 
independent from congress.
10  In many countries, MPs need to fill in more than one form either at the beginning of their job, during 
their work and at the end of their terms (e.g., financial interests, conflicts of interest, gifts, and travel 






                                                 
   
The “universal form” covers items in the following seven areas: (1) assets (e.g. 
real estate, vehicles, bank accounts, stocks, and business ownership); (2) liabilities (e.g., 
mortgages, loans); (3) expenditures (e.g., home expenses, education, health, taxes);  (4) 
income (e.g., from public and private employers, independent activities, businesses, 
financial gains, other sources such as gambling); (5) potential conflicts of interest (e.g., 
unpaid advisory work or board memberships, participation in associations and non-
profits, post-tenure agreements); (6) gifts; and (7) travel. 
Some countries restrict business activities of the MPs, their ability to receive gifts, 
or to own assets.  Such restrictions can substitute for disclosure.  The universal form 
allows us to account for such restrictions.  Whenever there is a restriction that is binding 
in a given item, we code the restriction as the highest disclosure standard. 
MPs may need to make two types of disclosure of items in these seven areas: (1) 
the values of their assets, liabilities, expenses, income, gifts, and travel, and (2) 
information needed to identify assets, liabilities, the sources of income, gifts and travel, 
and parties with whom they have relationships or associations.  We refer to these two 
types of disclosure as values and sources, recognizing that “sources” is a somewhat loose 
reference encompassing all matters of identification of assets or activities.  In our coding, 
for each of the areas, the index of values equals 0 if no disclosure is required, 0.5 if only 
aggregate values need to be disclosed (e.g., total wages, total real estate), and 1 if 
itemized values need to be disclosed.  Similarly, for each of the areas, the index of 
sources equals 1 if items need to be identified precisely and 0 otherwise.
11  We measure 
the indices of values and sources separately for what is available to congress and to the 
public.  These data are shown in the four columns under “form content” in Table 3.  
11  “Conflicts of interest” have no values.   Likewise, “expenditures” only have values, not sources. 
12  




                                                 
 
   
Measures based on the universal form can take into account the extent of 
disclosure not only by the MP, but also by family members.  We do not present results 
with family members, although our findings are robust to their inclusion.
12 
In sum, we have four disclosure content variables, based on what goes to congress 
and to the public, and dividing disclosures into values and sources.  The Canadian blank 
form illustrates the components of the “universal form.”  Canada has different disclosure 
standards for congress and the public.  We start by describing the blank form available to 
congress.  As explained above, there are seven areas of disclosures required from MPs. 
The first area is assets.  In Canada, MPs must fill out all the details (i.e., address, 
estimated value, description, purpose, co-owners) about their personal residence and 
other real property (i.e., buildings, farms, land, and property investments). The blank 
form also asks about the details and the values of business assets, as well as financial 
investments and securities (i.e., stocks, bonds, funds, options, insurance policies, savings 
plans, retirement accounts).  However, Canada only requires MPs to disclose an 
aggregate value for term deposits and other interest-bearing financial instruments, which 
would not allow the reader to know their individual values or their location.  Moreover, 
unlike many countries, Canada does not require the disclosure of movable assets, such as 
vehicles, jewelry, or art. Overall, Canada gets a values (sources) disclosure to congress 
score of 0.58 (0.67) in the category of assets.   
Liabilities are the second category of disclosure. Here the Canadian blank form 
requires all the information to identify individual debts or liabilities, mortgages, and 
guarantees in amounts over 10,000 Canadian dollars.  The form requests the amount of 
12  In our data, 73 of the 106 countries with blank form required the disclosure of all or some items for the 
family members of the MP.  All the analysis and regressions of the paper have also been conducted for 
indexes that average the content of both the MP form and the MP’s family form.  Results do not change.    
13  





                                                 
   
 
   
 
each obligation and the name of the creditor or lending institution. This information gives 
Canada a score of 1.0 for the disclosure of both values and sources of liabilities.     
The third area of disclosure is expenditures.  In Canada, as in the majority of 
countries in our sample, MPs are not required to detail their expenditure patterns, so 
Canada gets the minimum score of 0 for values in the expenditure area.
13 
The fourth area of disclosures is income.  In Canada, the blank form asks the MP 
to check from a list of possible sources of income and benefits beyond the parliamentary 
compensation (i.e., businesses, farms, jobs, partnerships, professions, offices and 
directorships, contracts, royalties, interest, dividends, rents, trusts, pensions, annuities, 
disability benefits).  In each case, the MP needs to identify the exact source and nature as 
well as the amount received in the past and the coming year.  Canada gets a score of 1.0 
for the disclosure of both values and sources of income.   
Potential conflicts of interest are also addressed prominently in the Canadian 
blank form, as it requests that the MP identify his activities and involvements in paid and 
unpaid contractual or employment relationships, professions, businesses, directorships 
and management positions in corporations, associations, trade unions and non-profit 
organizations.  The name of the organization and the MP’s position must be provided in 
each case.  He must also report his positions and incomes for the following 12 months. 
Canada has a score of 1.0 in the sources of conflicts of interest reported to congress.   
The last two areas covered by the universal form are travel and gifts.  Canadian 
MPs must file a form for each sponsored trip they undertake.  In this form, they provide 
13  Only 13 countries with available disclosure forms actually require expenditure disclosure.  Only El 
Salvador, Georgia, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, and Ukraine have disclosure levels that give them a score 








    
                                                 
     
 
    
the destination, dates, purpose, sponsors, accompanying passengers, and the description 
and value of gifts received, with supporting documents.  Canada gets a score of 1.0 in the 
areas of values and sources of travel.  Finally, Canadian MPs also have to file an 
additional form for each individual gift or benefit received, stating the nature, the source, 
and the circumstances.  Although we would know the specific value of gifts obtained 
during a trip, there is no general requirement to provide the individual value of each gift, 
so Canada scores 0.0 for the disclosure of gift values and 1.0 for gift sources.
14 
The average of the six indices of the areas of disclosures with values gives 
Canada a total score of values to congress of 0.76.  A similar calculation for the six 
indices of the areas of disclosure with sources gives Canada a score of 0.94.  Not all 
countries disclose as much as Canada.  The mean score over 175 countries for values 
available to congress is 0.22.  If we only consider the 106 countries with available blank 
forms, this mean rises to 0.34.   At the top are Canada, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Georgia, 
Israel, Indonesia, Namibia, Puerto Rico, and  St.  Lu cia, with scores above 0.65.  The 
mean score for sources available to congress is 0.29 over all countries and 0.45 over 
countries with an available blank form.  At the top are Australia, Canada, Israel, Namibia, 
Puerto Rico, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with scores above 0.80. 
Canada and another 25 countries only make a subset of disclosures available to 
the public.  The “summary” blank forms and the filled-out disclosure forms allow us to 
compute sources and values indices for disclosures available to the public, and not just to 
congress.  The Canadian values and sources disclosure scores fall to 0.33 and 0.92.  The 
14  Canadian gift policy is an example of binding restrictions.   The disclosure of gifts described above 
refers only to gifts which are considered to be an expression of courtesy or protocol.  Canadian MPs are 
prohibited from any other kind of gifts.  Because we code restrictions as the highest disclosure standard, 











main cause of this reduction is the suppression of the main details of the addresses of 
properties, and of the individual values of assets, liabilities and incomes.  Public 
disclosure in Canada still contains information that allows identification of accounts, 
assets, sources of income, and business connections.  The individual forms for gifts and 
travel are also publicly available in full.  Canada still ranks among the top ten countries in 
content of disclosures publicly-available.   
Columns 5 and 6 in Table 3 present the indices for values and sources publicly-
available in practice. These two columns are our most comprehensive summary measures 
of the content of MP disclosures, as they consider not only the breadth of the content of 
the forms, but also the failure of some countries to comply with their public disclosure 
laws and the availability of data in other countries despite the absence of legal mandates. 
In the full sample of 175 countries, the mean public disclosure score is 0.09 for values 
and 0.15 for sources.  If we focus on the countries for which we have a blank form, the 
mean public disclosure score is 0.14 for values and 0.24 for sources.  Transparency is 
quite scarce once we take both the completeness and the actual public availability of 
disclosures into account. 
The last two variables presented in Table 3 concern enforcement of disclosure. 
The first is the index of the strength of the registrar, the body that collects disclosures. 
This index reflects three dimensions: whether the registrar is independent from 
parliament, whether it publishes compliance data, and whether it can penalize MPs for 
failure to disclose.  The second enforcement measure is the index of the strength of the 
administrative unit which checks the accuracy of disclosure, which might be different 
from the registrar.  The index again aggregates information on whether this unit is 
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independent from parliament, whether it publishes the results of verification of accuracy 
of disclosure, and whether it can penalize MPs for inaccurate disclosure.  The strength of 
the registrar and the checking units are 0.32 and 0.21 for the full sample.  For the group 
of countries with available blank forms, the mean scores for the strength of the registrar 
and checking units are higher reaching 0.50 and 0.34 respectively.  
III. Determinants of Disclosure.  
Table 3 also presents average scores of disclosure variables grouped by income. 
Across our measures, high and upper middle income countries generally have the highest 
disclosure scores and low income countries the lowest.  Moreover, although disclosures 
of values and sources are positively correlated as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, high 
income countries stress the disclosure of sources over that of values.  Public disclosure of 
sources is the highest in rich countries (0.32) and declines monotonically with income. 
The corresponding values disclosure for high income countries (0.09) identical to the 
world mean.  Another finding is that enforcement variables are the highest in upper 
middle income countries.   
Table 4 examines the potential determinants of the six disclosure and two 
enforcement measures more systematically. We report OLS regressions but have 
confirmed our results using probits. We always include per capita income as an 
explanatory variable.  One might worry that income is endogenous, so we have also run 
all the regressions with latitude, yielding very similar results.  We also include the 
average democracy score over 1975-2006 from Polity IV, on the theory that disclosure is 





       
 




significant in the studies of public institutions, namely the percentage of population that 
is protestant (see, e.g., La Porta et al. 1999).  In Panel B, we alternatively add another 
common predictor of institutional arrangements (including transparency in the corporate 
sector), namely the legal origin of the country’s commercial laws (La Porta et al. 2008). 
We have also experimented with ethnic fractionalization, which has been shown to 
influence the quality of government (see, e.g., Easterly and Levine 1997, Alesina et al. 
2003), but it is never significant and so is omitted. 
The results in Table 4 confirm that economic development is associated with 
greater disclosure.  This is especially true for measures of disclosure to the public, as 
opposed to merely to congress.  A plausible interpretation of this finding is that richer (or 
higher human capital) countries demand greater accountability of their politicians, and to 
this end impose more stringent disclosure rules to promote such accountability.   There is 
no evidence that enforcement measures are higher in richer countries. 
An even stronger finding in Table 4 is that, for every single measure of disclosure, 
including enforcement, democratic countries have higher scores, even holding per capita 
income constant.  A plausible interpretation, again, is that disclosure is needed for 
political accountability, which works through the democratic process.  
The results on cultural and legal variables are mixed.   Percentage protestant is 
generally associated with lower disclosure requirements, less disclosure of values and 
sources to congress, and fewer enforcement powers, but with more publicly available 
disclosure of sources of assets and conflicts.   French civil law countries are similar to 
common law countries in their disclosure scores. German and Scandinavian civil law 








   
                                                 
 
   
   
law countries, but only German law countries have statistically higher content of values 
and sources publicly available than common law ones.  Partly as a result of the voluntary 
nature of disclosure in most Scandinavian countries, they show statistically lower indices 
of the strength of both the registrar and checking units than do common law countries. 
The bottom line so far is that per capita income and especially democracy are the 
strongest correlates of disclosure.  We can alternatively ask: what determines the 
difference between public disclosure and disclosure to congress, which we refer to as “the 
wedge”?  In Table 5, we use the difference between disclosures to public and to congress 
as dependent variables, and restrict attention to the subsample with some required 
disclosure.  As in Table 4, we use economic development, democracy, percentage 
protestant, and legal origins as explanatory variables.   Per capita income is a statistically 
significant predictor of the wedge.  Democracy enters negatively, but insignificantly, for 
public availability, values and sources disclosure. German and Scandinavian law 
countries have relatively more public disclosure than others.   The next question is which, 
if any, of these aspects of disclosure are related to perceived corruption.  
IV. Consequences of Disclosure for Perceived Corruption.  
To investigate the effect of disclosure on corruption, we focus on the average over 
2003-2007 corruption score from the International Country Risk Guide, a standard 
measure of perceived corruption with the largest span of country-years.  We look at key 
disclosure variables, and usually control for the log of income per capita in 2006.
15 
15 The results do not change if we control for our enforcement measures.  The results are also similar if we 
use lagged per capita income or latitude.   We have also added ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al 2003) 







Disclosure by politicians is part of a broader framework of accountability, which 
also includes the political system, media, and law enforcement.  Accordingly, in addition 
to considering disclosure by itself as a determinant of corruption, we also examine its 
consequences in conjunction with other measures of governance.  These fall into three 
groups.  First, we consider democracy and its types, including (1) average democracy 
over 1975-2006, introduced earlier, (2) proportional representation, and (3) party-
specific, as opposed to candidate-specific, voting.   Previous research shows that 
democracy and proportional representation are associated with lower corruption (Persson 
and Tabellini 2003).  Party-specific voting may deter corruption because parties bear the 
costs of corruption by their members, and so might discipline them on their own.    
Second, in most research in this area, media play a crucial role.  We consider 
three indicators of potential media effectiveness in deterring corruption.  The first two are 
government ownership of the press and of television, respectively, both of which may 
undermine media’s effectiveness in exposing corruption (Djankov et al. 2003).  The third 
indicator is the logarithm of daily newspaper circulation per thousand inhabitants, which 
in theory should improve media’s effectiveness.  
Third, again in most theories, the judiciary plays an important role in promoting 
the accountability of politicians.  Our measure of the power of the judiciary is judicial 
independence from La Porta et al. (2004), which is presumably helpful in making sure 
that judges can fight corruption without fear of retribution.   
Table 6 presents the results for two indicators of disclosure: to congress and to the 
public.  Table 7 then shows the results for the content of public disclosure for both values 







   
  
 
democratic countries.  Tables 10 and 11 examine the robustness of the results to 
alternative measure of corruption and additional controls.     
Before turning to the results on disclosure, Panel A of Table 6 presents the 
regressions of corruption on measures of governance other than the disclosure variables, 
such as democracy, media, and judicial independence.   All these measures of governance 
influence corruption.  Countries that are more democratic, have proportional 
representation, party-specific voting, low government ownership of the press and 
television, and independent judiciaries are all perceived to be less corrupt.  These are old 
results, and they raise the question of whether disclosure by politicians also matters. 
In panel B, we add the disclosure requirement dummy (disclosure to congress) to 
the specifications in Panel A.  In most of these specifications, the existence of the 
disclosure requirement by MPs is associated with higher, not lower, perceived corruption, 
although the results are only marginally significant. Only two other governance variables 
(democracy and judicial independence) are significant; the most important (and well-
known) influence on perceived corruption is per capita income (Treisman 2007).   
The results are radically different for public disclosure, as illustrated in Panel C. 
This variable is a statistically significant predictor of lower perceived corruption in every 
specification, even holding per capita income constant and controlling for other measures 
of governance.  Parameter estimates suggest that introducing public disclosure in practice 
raises the ICRG corruption score over a third of a standard deviation (which is 1.14). 
Only democracy and judicial independence retain statistical significance once public 
disclosure is used as an explanatory variable; media variables lose their significance.  Per 








   
   
 
                                                 
 
      
Table 7 focuses only on public disclosure, but distinguishes between values and 
sources.
16   As Panel A shows, public disclosure of values is never statistically 
significantly associated with perceived corruption.  In contrast, as we see in Panel B, 
greater public disclosure of sources by MPs is statistically significantly associated with 
lower perceived corruption in every specification.  Going from no to complete public 
disclosure of sources raises the ICRG score by about a standard deviation.   
Tables 8 and 9 consider the public disclosure indicator and public disclosure of 
sources, but divide countries into those with above and below mean average democracy 
scores.  Both of these public disclosure variables are consistently correlated with 
perceived corruption in democratic, but not in the undemocratic countries (Figures 3 and 
4).  This evidence is supportive of the idea that transparency matters in so far as it 
influences accountability.  We have run similar regressions dividing countries into those 
above and below the mean income per capita, and found that the benefits of public 
disclosure are concentrated in the richer countries.  
Table 10 presents the results for alternative measures of corruption using the 
public disclosure indicator and public disclosure of sources as alternative independent 
variables.  Panel A presents the results for the whole sample, Panel B for democracies. 
We consider five additional corruption measures: from Kaufmann et al. (2008), 
Transparency International, the Heritage Foundation, the Global Competitiveness Report, 
and for a few countries the percentage of firms reporting bribes from the World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys.  These variables are defined in Table 2.   
16  Disclosure of either sources or values to congress or to the public by law is uncorrelated with perceived 
corruption in similar regressions.   The enforcement variables come in significant, but with the “wrong” 










In the full sample, the public disclosure indicator does not predict other measures 
of corruption, while the public disclosure of sources predicts Kauffman et al. and 
Transparency International measures, but not the others.   For the democratic sub-sample, 
however, both the public indicator and the public disclosure of sources are statistically 
significant for all but the Enterprise Survey measures.  Our indicators of disclosure are 
significant in seven of the 10 specifications.  As in Tables 8 and 9, neither indicator is 
significant in the low democracy sub-sample.  In Table 11, we consider the robustness of 
these findings to the inclusion of percentage protestant, which has been shown in earlier 
work to influence corruption (La Porta et al. 1999).  Percentage protestant is highly 
predictive of lower corruption.  The results for the two measures of public disclosure 
become weaker, but they remain significant in ten of the twelve specifications for the 
democratic sub-sample shown in Panel B. 
V.  Conclusion. 
We present new measures of disclosure by MPs in 175 countries, and examine 
their determinants and influences on perceived corruption.  The measures distinguish 
between public and non-public disclosure and between more and less comprehensive 
disclosure.  These distinctions motivate the creation of several indices of disclosure. 
Several findings emerge.  First, there is tremendous variation among countries – 
and even among countries with some disclosure mandates – in whether disclosure is 
made public and how much is made public.  Only a third of the 175 countries allow 







   
 
 
Second, perhaps the crucial imperative for political accountability is that 
disclosure be made publicly.   Many countries keep disclosure by MPs in congress, and 
such secret disclosure, even if extensive, is uncorrelated with perceived corruption.  In 
contrast, public disclosure is associated with lower perceived corruption even controlling 
for other measures of governance, such as media freedom and democracy.   The privacy 
of politicians may have benefits, but those may come at a cost of higher corruption.  
Third, with respect to the content of disclosure, what matters most is identification 
of sources of an MP’s assets, gifts, and activities, rather than the reporting of values of 
assets and income.  This result is perhaps unsurprising once we recognize that disclosure 
of sources is crucial for detecting conflicts of interest.   
Fourth, public disclosure is strongly associated with lower corruption in the 
democratic but not the undemocratic countries, which points to complementarity of 
transparency and democratic governance.   
Our data do not allow for a causal interpretation of this evidence.  Public 
disclosure by MPs may reduce corruption, or, alternatively, legislatures in corrupt 
countries may successfully protect themselves against disclosure, particularly public 
disclosure of conflicts.  But this endogeneity concern only reinforces our message as to 
what might possibly work in reducing corruption; after all, there is surely a good reason 
why MPs wish to keep disclosures private.  And the message is this:  If a country, 
especially a democracy, wishes to pass disclosure laws with the aim of reducing 
corruption, the most effective laws are those that make disclosure public, and that focus 
on the sources of the MP’s assets and activities, rather than on values.  Secret disclosure, 
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28 Table 1: Sample distribution
Number of 
countries  Country names 
Initial sample  175 
Disclosures required by law 
Available to congress only 




 All publicly available directly w/o conditions 
46
 Only some disclosures publicly available 
6 Belgium,Colombia,Hungary,Italy,South Korea,Spain.
 Available only through press 
3 Armenia, Greece, Russia.
 Available to public under conditions 
9 Bahamas,Belize,Canada,Cape Verde,Kazakhstan, 
Mexico,Montenegro,Nicaragua,Spain. 
Could obtain filled-out forms 
51 Includes Bahrain (not publicly available by law).
 Failed to obtain filled-out forms  13 Algeria,Angola,Bahamas,Belize,Cape Verde, Kazakhstan, 
Mexico, Namibia,Nicaragua,Peru,Russia,Sri Lanka,Uganda. 
Disclosures not required but exist in practice  5 Denmark,Finland,Norway,Singapore,Zambia.
 Available to congress only  1 Singapore.
 Publicly available in practice  4 Denmark,Finland,Norway,Zambia. 




           
  
  
   
 
   





   
     
     
 
      





     
   
     
         
     




Description of the variables 
This table describes the variables collected for the 175 countries in our study.  Unless otherwise noted, the sources of the variables are the laws, 
regulations and blank disclosure forms for each country. 
Variable  Description 
1)Disclosure requirements and public availability of disclosures 
Disclosure required  This variable takes a value of 1 if the law or regulations of the country require MPs to provide either financial and/or business interests disclosures.  
The variable takes a value of zero otherwise. 
Publicly available  This variable takes a value of 1 if we got access to the filled-out forms of the MPs’ financial and business interests’ disclosures in the country. The 
variable also equals 1 if the country has voluntary disclosures available to the public and we could access the filled-out forms of the MPs. The variable 
takes a value of 0.5 if the country has two different standards for public availability of disclosures for the financial and the business interest forms, and 
only one of them was available (Belgium, Colombia, Hungary, Italy, and Spain).  The variable takes a value of zero if we failed to get access to the 
filled-out forms of the MPs or if the country has no public disclosure required from MPs. 
2) Measures of disclosure based on blank disclosure forms 
Values available to  The index of values available to congress measures the ratio of all value items contained in the country’s blank disclosure form available to congress 
congress  over all value items potentially disclosed in the artificial “universal” form.  It measures how many “conceivable” disclosures of value items are 
required to be disclosed to congress (or to an alternative government agency) by the MP.  To construct the measures of the content of disclosures, we 
use the blank disclosure forms collected from the 106 countries with available blank forms.  We begin by constructing an artificial “universal 
disclosure form,” which incorporates all the information that any country requires its MPs to disclose.  We then compare each country’s blank 
disclosure form to the universal form. For each item, we assign a score of 1 when the item is included in the country’s blank form requesting to 
provide disaggregated values (i.e., the value of each property, of each wage, etc…).  We assign a score of 0.5 for each item included in the country’s 
blank form requesting to provide only an aggregate value (i.e., the total value of all properties owned, total value of wages, etc…).  We assign a score 
of 0 when the country’s blank form does not include the specific item.  When the country imposes a binding restriction (i.e., which cannot be 
overturned) on a given item (i.e., the business activities of the MPs, their abilities to receive gifts, or to own stocks) we code the restriction as the 
highest possible disclosure standard. The scores of each item of disclosure in a particular area are then averaged to create an equally-weighted score of 
values for each area of disclosure.  Finally, the overall values score of the blank form is calculated as the equally-weighted average across all six 
categories with potential disclosure of value items (i.e., assets, liabilities, income, expenditure, gifts, and travel).  
Sources available to  The index of sources available to congress measures the ratio of all source items contained in the country’s blank disclosure form available to congress 
congress  over all source items potentially disclosed in the artificial “universal” form (see above). We compare each country’s blank disclosure form to the 
universal form.  For each item, we assign a score of 1 when the country’s blank form requests the information needed to identify the source (i.e., the 
precise location of assets, the identity of creditors, the source of income, gifts and travel, and the identity of parties with whom they work, they have 
relationships or associations, or with whom they have entered into post-tenure agreements).  We assign a score of 0 when the country’s blank form 
does not request the identification of the source of the specific item, or when the information requested is not sufficient to identify the item’s source.  
When the country imposes a binding restriction (i.e., which cannot be overturned) on a given item (i.e., the business activities of the MPs, their 
abilities to receive gifts, or to own stocks) we code the restriction as the highest possible disclosure standard.   The scores of each item of disclosure in 
a particular area are then averaged to create an equally-weighted score of sources for each area of disclosure.  Finally, the overall sources score of the 
blank form is calculated as the equally-weighted average across all six categories with potential disclosure of source items (i.e., assets, liabilities, 
income, conflicts of interest, gifts, and travel).   
 
         
     
       
 
 
   
       
     




   
 
     
         
 
  
   
   
 
  




           
    
 
 





   
     
     
 
Variable  Description 
Values publicly  The index of values publicly available measures the ratio of all value items contained in the country’s disclosure form available to the public over all 
available  value items potentially disclosed in the artificial “universal” form.  It measures how many “conceivable” disclosures of value items are publicly 
available in practice. This index is constructed following the same methodology described above for the score of “values available to congress,” but 
only takes into account completed disclosures we were able to obtain.  
Sources publicly  The index of sources publicly available measures the ratio of all source items contained in the country’s disclosure form available to the public over all 
available  source items potentially disclosed in the artificial “universal” form.  It measures how many “conceivable” disclosures of source items are publicly 
available in practice. This index is constructed following the same methodology described above for the score of “sources available to congress,” but it 
only takes account of completed disclosures we were able to obtain. 
3) Enforcement indices 
Registrar strength The index is the weighted average of three separate variables: (1) Registrar unit is independent from parliament.  This variable takes a value of 1 if 
there is a registrar where the MPs turn in their forms and this unit is independent from parliament, and zero otherwise. (2) Registrar unit publishes 
compliance data by law.  This variable takes a value of 1 if the law specifically requires that the registrar unit publishes compliance data by MPs, or if 
the law provides that disclosures are publicly available, and zero otherwise.  (3) Penalties for MPs’ failure to comply.  This variable takes a value of 1 
if the law establishes penalties for those MPs who do not submit their disclosures, or for any breach of the law that requires submission of the 
disclosures, and zero otherwise. 
Checking unit  The index is the weighted average of three separate variables: (1) Agency/Body that routinely checks the disclosures is independent from parliament. 
strength  This variable takes a value of 1 if there is an agency/body mandated by the law that is in charge of routinely checking the content of the disclosure 
forms and if this unit is independent from parliament. The variable takes a value of zero otherwise. (2) Data integrity unit publishes compliance data 
by law.  This variable takes a value of 1 if the law specifically requires that the data integrity unit publishes the results of checking the content of the 
disclosure forms by MPs, and zero otherwise.  (3) Penalties for submitting false information.  This variable takes a value of 1 if the law specifically 
establishes penalties for those MPs who provide false information in the disclosures.  The variable takes a value of zero if there are general penalties 
for a breach of the law, but not specific penalties for providing false information, or if there are no penalties established at all. 
4) Corruption measures 
ICRG corruption  The average of the index of corruption from the International Country Risk Guide between 2003 and 2007.  The scale of the index is from 0 to 6, 
index (2003-2007)  where higher numbers mean lower corruption.  Source: International Country Risk Guide, Political Risk Services. www.prsgroup.com. 
Kaufmann  The average score of the Kaufmann corruption index between 2003 and 2005.  The range of the score is from -2.5 to +2.5, with a higher score 
corruption index  indicating better governance.  Source: Kaufmann et al (2008).
(2003-2005) 
Transparency  The average score of the Transparency International index of corruption perception between 2003 and 2007. The index provides a measure of the 
International  extent to which corruption is perceived to exist in the public and political sectors. The index focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines 
corruption index  corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain.  It is based on assessments by experts and opinion surveys. The index ranges between 0 
(2003-2007)  (highly corrupt) and 10 (highly clean). Source: www.transparency.org. 
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Variable  Description 
Heritage Foundation  The average score of the Heritage Foundation index of corruption between 2003 and 2007.   The index is based on quantitative data that assess the 
corruption index  perception of corruption in the business environment, including levels of governmental, legal, judicial and administrative corruption.  The index is 
(2003-2007)  based on the index of Transparency International but supplemented with quantitative information from other sources.  The scale of the index is from 0 
to 100, where higher numbers mean less corruption.  Source: www.heritage.org. 
GCR corruption  The average score of the Global Competitiveness Report index of corruption between 2003 and 2007.  The index is based on survey measures that 
index (2003-2007)  include questions about the business costs of corruption.  The scale of the index is from 0 to 7, where higher numbers mean less corruption.  Source: 
International Country Risk Guide, Political Risk Services. www.prsgroup.com. 
Firms that pay bribes  The percentage of firms that report “paying bribes to get things done” from the World Banks’ Enterprise Survey.  The surveys collect information on 
(%)  firm characteristics, business perceptions, and indicators of the quality of the business environment.  Source: www.enterprisesurveys.org. 
5) Other Variables and Controls 
Log GNI per capita  Logarithmic of per capita Gross National Income Atlas Method (in US dollars) in 2006.  Source:  World Development Indicators at 
2006  http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/. 
Protestant 
The percentage of protestant population in the country in 1980. Source: La Porta et al (1999). population 
French civil law,  Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial law of each country.  Each dummy variable is equal to 1 if the origin of the company law  German civil law  or commercial law of the country is French, German or Scandinavian, respectively, and zero otherwise.  The omitted legal origin is English Common  and Scandinavian  law.  Source: La Porta et al (2008). law dummies 
Democracy (1975- Average democracy score from Polity IV for the years between 1975 and 2006. It is a measure of the degree of democracy in a given country based 
2006)  on: (1) the competitiveness of political participation; (2) the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment; and (3) the constraints on the 
chief executive. The democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale ranging from 0 to 10, where higher values equal a higher degree of 
institutionalized democracy.  Source: Jaggers and Marshall (2000) and updates of the Polity IV Database. 
Proportional  Average of the proportional representation score for the years between 1975 and 2006.  The variable equals 3 if 100 percent of the seats are assigned 
representation  via proportional rule, 2 if the majority of seats are assigned via proportional rule, 1 if a minority of seats is assigned proportionally, and zero if no seats 
(1975-2006)  are assigned through a proportional rule. Source: Beck et al (2001) and updates of World Bank  Database of Political Institutions. 
Party versus  Party versus candidate specific voting score for the year 2005.  The variable captures the distinction between casting votes either for parties or for 
candidate specific  individual candidates in the lower (or only) house.  The variable takes a value of zero in countries where voters have only one vote for a party. It takes 
voting  a value of 1 in countries where voters can vote for a party or a candidate, where voters have multiple votes for multiple candidates, or where votes for 
a party or candidate are observationally equivalent.  Finally, it takes a value of 2 for countries where voters have one vote for an individual candidate.  
Source: Johnson & Wallack (2006). 
Government 
ownership of the Market share of state-owned newspapers out of the aggregate market share of the five largest daily newspapers (by circulation).  Source: Djankov et al 










             
 
Variable  Description 
Government 
ownership of
(%)  TV 
Market share of state-owned television stations out of the aggregate market share of the five largest television stations (by viewership).  




Logarithm of newspapers and periodicals circulation per thousand inhabitants in the year 2000 (or closest available).
Statistical Database (http://unstats.un.org). 
  Source:  United Nations 
Judicial 
independence  The average of three variables: (1) Tenure of Supreme Court Judges; (2) Tenure of the Administrative Court Judges; and (3) Case Law.  Source: La 






















Full sample (175) 0.62 0.29 0.23 0.31 0.09 0.15 0.32 0.21
Countries with blank form (106) 0.95 0.49 0.37 0.48 0.14 0.24 0.50 0.34
High income (37) 0.76 
c 0.61 
a 0.20   0.41 
a 0.09 0.32  
a 0.27 0.19




a   0.16 
a 0.25 
 b   0.51 
a   0.37
 a
Lower middle income (59) 0.66   0.21   0.29 
c 0.31   0.08 0.08
 a 0.37 0.24
Low income (49) 0.35
 a 0.08 
a 0.11 
a 0.12 
a   0.04 
b 0.03 
a    0.18 
a   0.10
 a
Notes:
  Number of countries in parentheses.
  Significance levels: (a) if p<0.01; (b) if p<0.05; (c.) if p<0.10.
Table  3:  Disclosure and enforcement indices by income groups
Requirements and 
public availabitily
Form content (based on universal form 
concept) Enforcement
Panel A:  Means























Log GNI percapita 2006 0.0211 0.0843
a -0.0222
c 0.0118 0.0075 0.0462
a -0.0181 -0.0124


















[0.0020] [0.0015] [0.0010] [0.0015] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0012] [0.0009]
Constant 0.2282 -0.5268
a 0.2887




[0.1894] [0.1502] [0.0916] [0.1022] [0.0571] [0.0777] [0.1365] [0.1035]
Observations 149 149 142 142 149 149 149 149
R-squared 0.31 0.31 0.16 0.29 0.08 0.32 0.10 0.12
Log GNI percapita 2006 0.0384 0.0542
b -0.0173 0.0213 -0.0026 0.0352
a -0.0143 -0.0044










[0.0123] [0.0112] [0.0053] [0.0067] [0.0033] [0.0056] [0.0084] [0.0070]
French civil law dummy 0.0447 -0.0047 0.0034 -0.0580 0.0136 -0.0489 0.0416 0.0510
[0.0834] [0.0733] [0.0479] [0.0508] [0.0278] [0.0431] [0.0607] [0.0449]
German civil law dummy 0.1289 0.4440




[0.0870] [0.1062] [0.0676] [0.0713] [0.0590] [0.0808] [0.0976] [0.0698]




a -0.0067 0.0901 -0.3208
a -0.2988
a
[0.2358] [0.0914] [0.0627] [0.0913] [0.0658] [0.0942] [0.1011] [0.0546]
Constant 0.0313 -0.3251
b 0.2322
b 0.0110 0.0345 -0.2023
b 0.2637
c 0.1074
[0.1967] [0.1452] [0.1034] [0.1148] [0.0610] [0.0841] [0.1519] [0.1088]
Observations 153 153 146 146 153 153 153 153
R-squared 0.34 0.41 0.19 0.37 0.23 0.36 0.12 0.12
Significance levels: (a) if p<0.01; (b) if p<0.05; (c.) if p<
Panel A: Controlling for religion
Table 4:  Cross-sectional determinants of disclosure and enforcement
Requirements and 
public availabitily
Form Content (based on universal form 
concept) Enforcement
Panel B: Controlling for legal origins
Robust standard errors in bracketsTable 5: Determinants of the wedge between disclosures to public and to congress 
Dependent variable is:  Public availability  Values disclosure  Sources disclousure 
.  wedge  wedge  wedge 
Panel A: Controlling for religion 








































R-squared  0.28  0.15  0.24 
Panel B: Controlling for legal origins 
Log GNI percapita 2006 
Democracy (1975-2006) 
French civil law dummy 
German civil law dummy 






















































R-squared  0.35  0.23  0.31 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
Significance levels: (a) if p<0.01; (b) if p<0.05; (c.) if p<0.10. Table  6: Disclosure and perceived corruption. 
Dependent variable in all regressions: ICRG corruption index (2003-2007) 
Proportional  Party vs  Government  Government 
Democracy  representation  candidate- owned press  owned TV  Newspaper  Judicial 
Additional control variable is:  (1975-2006)  (1975-2006)  specific voting  (%)  (%)  circulation  independence 
Panel A: No disclosure variables 






























[0.0994]  [0.154]  [0.167]  [0.155]  [0.240]  [0.307]  [0.226] 
Observations  137  126  104  89  89  78  68 
R-squared  0.34  0.06  0.02  0.22  0.04  0.41  0.09 
Panel B: Controlling for income per capita and disclosure requirement 
Additional control variable  0.1115
a  0.1308  0.04554  -0.2727  -0.1293  -0.0199  0.8536
a 
[0.0281]  [0.177]  [0.143]  [0.256]  [0.292]  [0.0967]  [0.299] 
























































[0.418]  [0.415]  [0.432]  [0.493]  [0.597]  [0.620]  [0.625]  [0.532] 
Observations  132  128  121  99  86  86  76  66 
R-squared  0.45  0.51  0.51  0.55  0.57  0.56  0.60  0.63 
Panel C: Controlling for income per capita and publicly available disclosures 
Additional control variable  0.0634
b  0.00083  0.1002  0.04948  0.1687  -0.0628  0.5286
c 
[0.0266]  [0.174]  [0.134]  [0.265]  [0.254]  [0.0910]  [0.286] 


























































[0.412]  [0.438]  [0.438]  [0.516]  [0.637]  [0.601]  [0.627]  [0.608] 
Observations  132  128  121  99  86  86  76  66 
R-squared  0.48  0.49  0.49  0.54  0.56  0.57  0.60  0.66 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
Significance levels: (a) if p<0.01; (b) if p<0.05; (c.) if p<0.10. Table  7: Disclosure and perceived corruption; values and sources. 
Dependent variable in all regressions is: ICRG corruption index (2003-2007) 
Proportional  Party vs  Government  Government 
Democracy  representation  candidate- owned press  owned TV  Newspaper  Judicial 
Additional control variable is:  (1975-2006)  (1975-2006)  specific voting  (%)  (%)  circulation  independence 
Panel A: Controlling for income per capita and values publicly available 
Additional control variable  0.0804
a  0.0513  0.0913  -0.1352  0.1040  -0.0543  0.8143
a 
[0.0270]  [0.1771]  [0.1386]  [0.2775]  [0.2720]  [0.0894]  [0.2994] 









[0.0535]  [0.0605]  [0.0593]  [0.0645]  [0.0709]  [0.0656]  [0.1010]  [0.0634] 
Values publicly available  0.0399  -0.1915  -0.1753  -0.3150  -0.0946  0.0073  -0.0124  0.2223 
[0.4017]  [0.4160]  [0.4173]  [0.4321]  [0.5285]  [0.4976]  [0.4915]  [0.6952] 
Constant  -1.1675







[0.4218]  [0.4396]  [0.4410]  [0.5149]  [0.6235]  [0.6048]  [0.6356]  [0.5552] 
Observations  132  128  121  99  86  86  76  66 
R-squared  0.44  0.48  0.48  0.53  0.54  0.54  0.57  0.63 
Panel B: Controlling for income per capita and sources publicly available 
Additional control variable  0.0582
b  0.0252  0.1065  0.0529  0.2513  -0.0404  0.4806
c 
[0.0261]  [0.1663]  [0.1316]  [0.2508]  [0.2434]  [0.0868]  [0.2842] 









[0.0554]  [0.0615]  [0.0635]  [0.0692]  [0.0762]  [0.0699]  [0.1033]  [0.0746] 









[0.3112]  [0.3278]  [0.3209]  [0.3192]  [0.3477]  [0.3444]  [0.3430]  [0.4168] 







[0.4293]  [0.4466]  [0.4614]  [0.5398]  [0.6444]  [0.6145]  [0.6454]  [0.6365] 
Observations  132  128  121  99  86  86  76  66 
R-squared  0.49  0.50  0.50  0.55  0.58  0.59  0.60  0.67 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
Significance levels: (a) if p<0.01; (b) if p<0.05; (c.) if p<0.10. Table 8: Perceived corruption and publicly available disclosures: the role of democracy. 
Dependent variable in all regressions is: ICRG corruption index (2003-2007) 
Proportional  Party vs  Government  Government 
Additional control variable  Democracy  representation  candidate- owned press  owned TV  Newspaper  Judicial 
is:  (1975-2006)  (1975-2006)  specific voting  (%)  (%)  circulation  independence 
Panel A: Above the mean democracy (1975-2006) score 
Additional control variable  0.05348  -0.00071  0.1266  0.9845  0.4210  0.1922  1.0431
c 
[0.0559]  [0.215]  [0.150]  [1.507]  [0.455]  [0.172]  [0.532] 












































[0.628]  [0.625]  [0.641]  [0.662]  [1.235]  [0.852]  [0.791]  [1.248] 
Observations  65  65  64  60  47  47  52  39 
R-squared  0.65  0.66  0.65  0.64  0.64  0.65  0.67  0.67 
Panel B: Below the mean democracy (1975-2006) score 
Additional control variable  0.09033  0.1173  0.0504  -0.1543  0.1168  0.08566  0.2948 



















[0.0772]  [0.0789]  [0.114]  [0.144]  [0.106]  [0.112]  [0.213]  [0.128] 



















[0.546]  [0.584]  [0.736]  [0.960]  [0.736]  [0.828]  [1.325]  [0.999] 
Observations  63  63  55  38  39  39  21  27 
R-squared  0.08  0.10  0.09  0.13  0.20  0.19  0.30  0.31 
Panel C: Tests for the equality of public availability across groups 
F-Statistic  2.08  2.98  2.01  1.42  0.82  0.64  3.17  1.07 
Prob > F  0.1521  0.0869  0.1595  0.2358  0.3668  0.4247  0.0798  0.3046 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
Significance levels: (a) if p<0.01; (b) if p<0.05; (c.) if p<0.10. Table 9: Perceived corruption and sources publicly available: the role of democracy. 
Dependent variable in all regressions is: ICRG corruption index (2003-2007) 
Proportional  Party vs  Government  Government 
Democracy  representation  candidate- owned press  owned TV  Newspaper  Judicial 
Additional control variable is:  (1975-2006)  (1975-2006)  specific voting  (%)  (%)  circulation  independence 
Panel A: Above the mean democracy (1975-2006) score 
Additional control variable  0.0469  0.0905  0.1356  1.3542  0.5277  0.2317  0.9752
c 
[0.0568]  [0.2180]  [0.1433]  [1.4110]  [0.4394]  [0.1681]  [0.5610] 












































[0.6747]  [0.6765]  [0.6823]  [0.7094]  [1.2690]  [0.8815]  [0.8200]  [1.2914] 
Observations  65  65  64  60  47  47  52  39 
R-squared  0.65  0.65  0.65  0.64  0.64  0.65  0.67  0.66 
Panel B: Below the mean democracy (1975-2006) score 
Additional control variable  0.0804  0.1004  0.0545  -0.1062  0.1599  0.0664  0.2244 



















[0.0762]  [0.0783]  [0.1102]  [0.1474]  [0.1063]  [0.1104]  [0.2358]  [0.1314] 



















[0.5418]  [0.5850]  [0.7204]  [0.9833]  [0.7490]  [0.8281]  [1.4638]  [1.0229] 
Observations  63  63  55  38  39  39  21  27 
R-squared  0.08  0.10  0.09  0.13  0.22  0.22  0.28  0.33 
Panel C: Tests for the equality of  sources publicly available across groups 
F-Statistic  0.52  1.08  0.66  0.55  0.04  0.00  2.13  0.02 
Prob > F  0.4716  0.3001  0.4171  0.4594  0.8445  0.9748  0.1496  0.8869 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
Significance levels: (a) if p<0.01; (b) if p<0.05; (c.) if p<0.10.            









Foundation  GCR 
































Panel  A:  Full sample 
Democracy (1975-2006) 
Log GNI per capita 2006 
Publicly available 

















































































































R-squared  0.71  0.71  0.72  0.59  0.28  0.72  0.71  0.72  0.59  0.28 
Panel  B: Subsample of countries with high democracy scores (above the mean democracy (1975-2006)) 
Democracy (1975-2006)  0.0729
c  0.1647
c  0.7824  0.0772  2.8567 
[0.0390]  [0.0915]  [1.1750]  [0.0601]  [2.2591] 




a  -5.9726 
[0.0525]  [0.1172]  [1.7081]  [0.0910]  [6.1532] 
Publicly available  0.2790
b  0.6233b  4.8038  0.2728
c  -5.0690 
[0.1251]  [0.2900]  [3.2692]  [0.1551]  [5.3660] 





b  60.4171 
[0.3331]  [0.7194]  [9.8883]  [0.4972]  [42.8801] 
Observations  71  71  68  68  35 
R-squared  0.82  0.79  0.75  0.72  0.12 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
Significance levels: (a) if p<0.01; (b) if p<0.05; (c.) if p<0.10. 
0.0699
c  0.1566
c  0.7595  0.0755  2.8125 





a  -5.1198 





b  -11.2415 





b  53.9245 
[0.3433]  [0.7539]  [10.0478]  [0.4954]  [44.4919] 
71  71  68  68  35 
0.82  0.79  0.76  0.72  0.13 Table 11: All corruption measures, disclosure indices and religion 
Transparency  Heritage  Transparency  Heritage 
ICRG  Kaufmann  International  Foundation  GCR  ICRG  Kaufmann  International  Foundation  GCR 

























.  (2003-2007)  (2003-2005)  (2003-2007)  (2003-2007)  (2003-2007)  (%)  (2003-2007)  (2003-2005)  (2003-2007)  (2003-2007)  (2003-2007)  (%) 
Panel A: Full sample 
Democracy (1975-2006) 































































[0.0612]  [0.0376]  [0.0816]  [0.8424]  [0.0523]  [2.2259] 
Sources publicly available 
[0.1770]  [0.1073]  [0.2389]  [2.4156]  [0.1381]  [4.4142] 
0.6861

































































[0.4207]  [0.2457]  [0.5178]  [5.4251]  [0.3673]  [14.4944]  [0.4313]  [0.2489]  [0.5240]  [5.4941]  [0.3700]  [15.0070] 
Observations  127  149  149  139  123  76  127  149  149  139  123  76 
R-squared  0.56  0.74  0.75  0.77  0.64  0.33  0.56  0.75  0.75  0.77  0.64  0.33 
Panel B:  Subsample of countries with high democracy scores (above the mean democracy (1975-2006)) 
Democracy (1975-2006) 
























































[0.1075]  [0.0571]  [0.1242]  [1.6490] 
Sources publicly available 




























































[0.6642]  [0.3246]  [0.6851]  [8.6637]  [0.5248]  [44.0582]  [0.7128]  [0.3330]  [0.7131]  [8.9236] 
Observations  64  69  69  66  65  34  64  69  69  66 
R-squared  0.70  0.84  0.83  0.81  0.76  0.20  0.70  0.84  0.83  0.81 
Robust standard errors in brackets
Significance levels: (a) if p<0.01; (b) if p<0.05; (c.) if p<0.10.
0.0763  2.3870 
[0.0610]  [2.4563] 
0.4789
a  -2.9703 








[0.0020]  [0.1050] 
-0.5149  42.6933 
[0.5175]  [45.6654] 
65  34 








Figures 1 and 2 











 Figures 3 and 4 
Partial scatter plots of publicly available and the ICRG corruption index (2003-2007) for the subsamples of 
countries above (Figure 3) and below (Figure 4) the mean value of the democracy score (1975-2006) of our 
sample of 175 countries.  The dependent variable is the ICRG corruption index (2003-2007). In addition to 
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Publicly available 
coef = -.11028699, (robust) se = .29916138, t = -.37 
2Appendix A:  Disclosure and enforcement indices by income groups 
Requirements and 






















Panel A: High income with publicly available disclosures 
Australia  1.00  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.33  0.33 
Austria  1.00  1.00  0.02  0.24  0.02  0.24  0.00  0.00 
Bahrain  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.18  0.00  0.18  0.00  0.00 
Belgium  1.00  0.50  0.03  0.48  0.00  0.29  0.83  0.67 
Canada  1.00  1.00  0.76  0.94  0.33  0.92  0.00  0.00 
Denmark  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.52  0.00  0.00 
Finland  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.29  0.44  0.00  0.00 
Germany  1.00  1.00  0.45  0.65  0.33  0.65  0.67  0.33 
Greece  1.00  0.00  0.31  0.28  0.00  0.00  0.33  0.67 
Hong Kong, China  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.48  0.00  0.48  0.33  0.00 
Ireland  1.00  1.00  0.08  0.57  0.08  0.57  0.00  0.00 
Italy  1.00  0.50  0.11  0.36  0.11  0.18  0.33  0.00 
Japan  1.00  1.00  0.33  0.28  0.33  0.26  0.33  0.00 
Korea  1.00  1.00  0.40  0.40  0.40  0.40  0.00  0.17 
Luxembourg  1.00  1.00  0.14  0.18  0.14  0.18  0.00  0.00 
Netherlands  1.00  1.00  0.29  0.58  0.29  0.58  0.00  0.00 
New Zealand  1.00  1.00  0.08  0.79  0.08  0.79  0.33  0.33 
Norway  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.65  0.00  0.00 
Portugal  1.00  1.00  0.27  0.64  0.27  0.64  0.50  0.50 
Spain  1.00  0.50  0.25  0.52  0.00  0.24  0.17  0.33 
Sweden  1.00  1.00  0.08  0.31  0.08  0.31  0.33  0.00 
Switzerland  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.22  0.00  0.22  0.33  0.00 
Taiwan, China  1.00  1.00  0.22  0.38  0.22  0.38  1.00  0.67 
United Kingdom  1.00  1.00  0.12  0.83  0.12  0.83  0.00  0.00 
United States  1.00  1.00  0.34  0.87  0.34  0.87  0.33  0.33
 Mean  0.88  0.90  0.17  0.45  0.14  0.47  0.25  0.17 
Panel B: High income with disclosures available to congress 
Antigua and Barbuda  1.00  0.00  0.50  0.63  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.33 
Bahamas  1.00  0.00  0.39  0.38  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.67 
France  1.00  0.00  0.32  0.55  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.33 
Israel  1.00  0.00  0.83  0.83  0.00  0.00  0.33  0.00 
Puerto Rico  1.00  0.00  0.83  0.96  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.67 
Singapore  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Slovenia  1.00  0.00  0.33  0.73  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.67
 Mean  0.86  0.00  0.46  0.58  0.00  0.00  0.57  0.38 
Panel C: High income without disclosure requirements 
Brunei  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Kuwait  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Qatar  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Saudi Arabia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
United Arab Emirates  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 Mean  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Panel D: Upper middle income with publicly available disclosures 
Argentina  1.00  1.00  0.64  0.61  0.64  0.61  0.00  0.00 
Chile  1.00  1.00  0.31  0.51  0.31  0.51  0.33  0.33 
Croatia  1.00  1.00  0.40  0.51  0.40  0.51  0.67  0.33 
Czech Republic  1.00  1.00  0.62  0.68  0.62  0.68  0.33  0.33 
Estonia  1.00  1.00  0.28  0.57  0.19  0.47  0.67  0.33 
Hungary  1.00  0.50  0.28  0.42  0.28  0.30  0.50  0.00 
Latvia  1.00  1.00  0.38  0.57  0.29  0.40  0.67  0.67 
Lithuania  1.00  1.00  0.51  0.75  0.26  0.75  0.33  0.00 
Palau  1.00  1.00  0.64  0.73  0.64  0.73  1.00  0.67 Appendix A:  Disclosure and enforcement indices by income groups 
Requirements and 
public availability  Form content (based on universal form concept)  Enforcement 
Values  Sources  Values  Sources 
Dsclosure  Publicly  available to  available to  publicly  publicly  Registrar  Checking 
Country required  available  congress  congress  available  available  strength  unit strength 
Poland  1.00  1.00  0.32  0.84  0.28  0.79  0.17  0.33 
Romania  1.00  1.00  0.60  0.79  0.60  0.79  0.67  1.00 
Slovakia  1.00  1.00  0.34  0.48  0.19  0.28  0.33  0.33 
South Africa  1.00  1.00  0.29  0.66  0.22  0.66  0.33  0.33
 Mean  1.00  0.96  0.43  0.63  0.38  0.58  0.46  0.36 
Panel E: Upper middle income with disclosures available to congress 
Belize  1.00  0.00  0.44  0.38  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.67 
Costa Rica  1.00  0.00  0.67  0.67  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.33 
Gabon  1.00  0.00  0.29  0.45  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.67 
Lebanon  1.00  0.00  0.10  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.33 
Mauritius  1.00  0.00  0.15  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.33 
Mexico  1.00  0.00  0.46  0.62  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.33 
Russia  1.00  0.00  0.35  0.45  0.00  0.00  0.33  0.67 
St. Lucia  1.00  0.00  0.67  0.67  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Trinidad and Tobago  1.00  0.00  0.64  0.73  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.67 
Turkey  1.00  0.00  0.31  0.38  0.00  0.00  0.33  0.33 
Uruguay  1.00  0.00  0.46  0.49  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.33 
Venezuela  1.00  0.00  0.37  0.38  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.67
 Mean  1.00  0.00  0.41  0.44  0.00  0.00  0.78  0.53 
Panel F: Upper middle income without disclosure requirements 
Botswana  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Malaysia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Oman  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Panama  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Seychelles  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 Mean  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Panel G: Lower middle income with publicly available disclosures 
Albania  1.00  1.00  0.64  0.77  0.48  0.60  0.67  0.67 
Armenia  1.00  1.00  0.34  0.45  0.27  0.37  0.67  0.33 
Bolivia  1.00  1.00  0.48  0.48  0.11  0.00  0.67  0.00 
Bulgaria  1.00  1.00  0.50  0.33  0.50  0.33  1.00  0.67 
Colombia  1.00  0.50  0.44  0.60  0.10  0.27  0.33  0.00 
Dominican Republic  1.00  1.00  0.32  0.35  0.32  0.35  0.67  0.00 
Georgia  1.00  1.00  0.71  0.70  0.71  0.70  0.67  0.33 
Indonesia  1.00  1.00  0.73  0.68  0.22  0.18  1.00  0.33 
Macedonia  1.00  1.00  0.55  0.49  0.49  0.35  0.67  0.33 
Moldova  1.00  1.00  0.41  0.40  0.41  0.40  0.33  0.67 
Montenegro  1.00  1.00  0.40  0.42  0.28  0.42  0.33  0.00 
Philippines  1.00  1.00  0.21  0.34  0.21  0.34  0.33  0.00 
Thailand  1.00  1.00  0.58  0.59  0.58  0.59  0.67  0.67
 Mean  1.00  0.96  0.48  0.51  0.36  0.38  0.62  0.31 
Panel H: Lower middle income with disclosures available to congress 
Algeria  1.00  0.00  0.06  0.21  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.33 
Angola  1.00  0.00  .  .  0.00  0.00  0.33  0.00 
Belarus  1.00  0.00  0.64  0.67  0.00  0.00  0.33  0.33 
Bhutan  1.00  0.00  0.40  0.38  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.33 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  1.00  0.00  0.31  0.42  0.00  0.00  0.33  0.33 
Brazil  1.00  0.00  0.62  0.50  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.67 
Cape Verde  1.00  0.00  0.26  0.51  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.33 
Ecuador  1.00  0.00  0.36  0.38  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.33 
Egypt  1.00  0.00  0.28  0.60  0.00  0.00  0.33  0.33 
El Salvador  1.00  0.00  0.46  0.40  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.33 
Guatemala  1.00  0.00  0.58  0.55  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.33 Appendix A:  Disclosure and enforcement indices by income groups 
Requirements and 
public availability  Form content (based on universal form concept)  Enforcement 
Values  Sources  Values  Sources 
Dsclosure  Publicly  available to  available to  publicly  publicly  Registrar  Checking 
Country required  available  congress  congress  available  available  strength  unit strength 
Guyana  1.00  0.00 
Honduras  1.00  0.00 
Jamaica  1.00  0.00 
Jordan  1.00  0.00 
Kazakhstan  1.00  0.00 
Morocco  1.00  0.00 
Namibia  1.00  0.00 
Nicaragua  1.00  0.00 
Paraguay  1.00  0.00 
Peru  1.00  0.00 
Serbia  1.00  0.00 
Sri Lanka  1.00  0.00 
Swaziland  1.00  0.00 
Ukraine  1.00  0.00 
Vanuatu  1.00  0.00 
Mean  1.00  0.00 
0.44  0.71  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.67 
0.54  0.54  0.00  0.00  0.67  1.00 
0.67  0.50  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.67 
0.17  0.21  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.67 
0.26  0.28  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.67 
.  .  0.00  0.00  0.33  0.00 
0.73  0.88  0.00  0.00  0.33  0.33 
0.64  0.64  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.67 
0.56  0.47  0.00  0.00  0.33  0.33 
0.58  0.38  0.00  0.00  0.33  0.33 
0.40  0.57  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.67 
0.22  0.40  0.00  0.00  0.33  0.33 
.  .  0.00  0.00  0.33  0.00 
0.27  0.16  0.00  0.00  0.33  0.33 
0.22  0.14  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.33
0.42  0.46  0.00  0.00  0.54  0.41 
Panel I: Lower middle income without disclosure requirements 
Azerbaijan  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Cameroon  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
China  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Congo, Republic  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Djibouti  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Dominica  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Fiji  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Iran  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Iraq  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Kiribati  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Lesotho  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Maldives  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Micronesia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
St. Vincent & Grenadines  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Suriname  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Syria  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Tonga  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Tunisia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
West Bank and Gaza  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Western Samoa  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 Mean  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Panel J: Low income with publicly available disclosures 
Kyrgyz Republic  1.00  1.00  0.63  0.67  0.44  0.31  0.67  0.67 
Mongolia  1.00  1.00  0.62  0.64  0.62  0.64  1.00  0.33 
Pakistan  1.00  1.00  0.25  0.21  0.25  0.21  1.00  0.33 
Zambia  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.56  0.50  0.33  0.00
 Mean  0.75  1.00  0.38  0.38  0.47  0.42  0.75  0.33 
Panel K: Low income with disclosures available to congress 
Comoros  1.00  0.00 
Ghana  1.00  0.00 
India  1.00  0.00 
Kenya  1.00  0.00 
Madagascar  1.00  0.00 
Nigeria  1.00  0.00 
Papua New Guinea  1.00  0.00 
Rwanda  1.00  0.00 
Sao Tome and Principe  1.00  0.00 
Solomon Island  1.00  0.00 
Tanzania  1.00  0.00 
Togo  1.00  0.00 
.  .  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.48  0.56  0.00  0.00  0.33  0.33 
0.33  0.38  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.42  0.21  0.00  0.00  0.33  0.00 
0.33  0.38  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.67 
0.55  0.55  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.33 
.  .  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.67 
0.33  0.38  0.00  0.00  0.33  0.00 
.  .  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
.  .  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.33 
0.51  0.55  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.33 
.  .  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 Appendix A:  Disclosure and enforcement indices by income groups 
Requirements and 

















































Panel L: Low income without disclosure requirements 
Afghanistan  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Bangladesh  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Benin  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Burkina Faso  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Burundi  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Cambodia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Central African Republic  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Chad  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Congo, Democratic Republic  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Côte d'Ivoire  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Eritrea  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Ethiopia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Gambia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Guinea-Bissau  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.33 
Guinea  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Haiti  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Lao, People's Dem. Rep.  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Liberia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Malawi  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Mali  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Mauritania  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Mozambique  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Niger  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Senegal  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Sierra Leone  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Sudan  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Tajikistan  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Timor-Leste  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Uzbekistan  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Yemen, Rep.  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Zimbabwe  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 Mean  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.01 
Note:  As reported in the text, there are 8 countries where we could not obtain the blank form (see text for details).  These countries have a "." in 
the diclosures of values and sources for congress.  In all cases, these countries do not make the disclosures publicly available. 